By Omid Mahmoud
When the institutions of the Kurdistan Region or a political party in the region are experiencing tensions and internal strife or problems with Baghdad or a regional state, we often hear and read in many media and political sources, "This is the view of the Iraqi Shiites on this issue."
The question here is, do the Iraqi Shiite parties all share a common vision for the Kurdistan Region? Or rather, each side has its own views on the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish political parties, depending on the nature of its internal structure and its relations with neighboring countries.
Undoubtedly, not all Shiite parties in Iraq have a common vision for the Kurdistan Region, and each party, according to its internal structure and the nature of its relations with neighboring countries, has a special view of Iraq's internal affairs. They will also have their own views on the political parties in the Kurdistan Region and the government and official institutions in the Kurdistan Region.
The most influential Shiite political parties and their views at the moment are:
Among the most influential Shiite parties today is the Badr Organization, which was established as the military wing of the Supreme Islamic Council in 1982. But later in 2012, the Badr Organization, led by Hadi Amiri, separated from the Supreme Council and participated in the political process independently. In the last elections, he won 47 seats in the Iraqi parliament.
At first glance, it seems that--since Badr has become the military wing of the Supreme Council--it is necessary for the Supreme Council to have the same vision of the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish political parties. But this is not the case, Badr has a different view of the Kurdistan Region, especially after his separation from the Supreme Council.
For example, after the enactment of the Iraqi constitution in 2006, the leadership of the Supreme Council, then headed by Abdul Aziz Hakim, expressed its readiness to support the return of Kirkuk and the disputed areas to the federalism of the Kurdistan Region. However, Badr is currently working in the opposite direction and is in favor of the Kurdistan Region having the least power.
In 2016, there were several clashes between the Peshmerga forces and PMF in Saadiyah, near Baquba in Diyala and Duzkhurmatu in southern Kirkuk.
According to the sources, the PMF forces were close to Badr, which has good relations with parties that are close to the Resistance Front and support the Kurdistan Region's remaining within Iraq, were behind the attack.
Another important Shiite aspect is the Dawa Party:
The Dawa Party is considered one of the oldest Shiite political forces, although its views on the Kurds and Kurdish political forces before the fall of Saddam Hussein, especially between 1960 and 1990, are unclear. Or rather, he did not take any serious attitude towards the Kurds, except that he said in the early 1960s that the Kurdish problem should be solved in a non-military manner. After the fall of the regime until 2008, the party had the same view of the Kurdistan region
But since that year, we have seen a new view of the Dawa Party led by al-Maliki towards the Kurds, which includes talking about reducing the powers of the Kurdistan Region and establishing tribal reference councils.
This season of conflict between the Kurdistan Region and the Dawa Party led by al-Maliki continued until after the 2010 elections, but after he regained the position of prime minister for the second time with the support of Kurdish forces, the conflict between the Dawa Party and Kurdish political forces subsided for a while.
However, it was not long before Tariq al-Hashemi was granted refuge in the Kurdistan Regional Government, a prominent member of the Dawa Party called for a budget cut in January 2012. In June of the same year, Hussain Shahristani formally called for a budget cut. Then al-Maliki announced an operation in Kirkuk and Sinjar and the tensions between the Dawa Party and the Kurdistan Region reached their peak.
The Dawa Party, as a party in the Resistance Front, has always tried to take advantage of this card, so during the heightened tensions between this party and the political parties in the Kurdistan Region in 2012, the party tried to create problems in the relations between the Kurdistan Region and Iran.
The Sadrists are another important Shiite faction in Iraq:
The Sadrists began their emergence as an armed movement called the Mahdi Army, which launched armed activities against coalition forces and Iraqi government forces in August 2004. These activities continued until 2008. The Sadrist movement participated in the political process in the government of Ibrahim Jaafari. They later, by four ministers, participated in Prime Minister Maliki's first term. But the events of the time, known as Operation Knight's Charge (Saulat al-Fursan), in which Maliki used government forces against the Mahdi's army, forced the Sadrists to withdraw from the government.
This was the beginning of the establishment of a special political line of the Sadrists, which is completely different from that of the Da'wa Party. Although Sadr later participated in successive Iraqi governments, for example, in the post-2010 government with eight ministers, and then in the post-2014 government received five important positions, yet despite of this, the Sadrists have not abandoned their own political line, which is a line away from the resistance front and Iran.
This forced the Sadrists to withdraw from the political process twice in 2014. In the beginning of the Sadrists' participation in the Iraqi political process, they followed the same policy of the Da'wa Party towards the Kurdistan Region and Kurdish forces, but later when the Sadrists separated their political line from the Da'wa Party, their views changed. For example, in the heat of the conflict between the Kurdistan Region and Maliki, the leader of the Da'wa Party in 2012, the Sadr Movement issued a statement on November 29, 2012, saying that the issues between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad should be resolved peacefully. Later, the Sadrists had a positive view of the Kurdistan Region on issues such as the right to self-determination and the raising of the Kurdistan flag in Kirkuk.
Another important aspect of the Shiite parties is National Wisdom Stream
The movement began in 2017, when Ammar Hakim, the then speaker of the Supreme Council, announced that he would resign and establish a new movement called the Wisdom Movement. This was interpreted as a deviation of Ammar Hakim and much of the leadership of the Supreme Islamic Assembly from the political line on which his party was founded in 1982, which is an Iranian line working to carry out the Islamic Revolution in Iraq similar to the revolution in Iran. But the Supreme Council remained on the old line, for example, in the 2018 elections, the Council formed an alliance with the Fatah list (Hadi Amiri), which is on the same political line.
However, as a sign of the difference in political lines of National Wisdom Stream, the movement contested the elections alone.
The Movement's views on the Kurdistan Region and the political forces have always emphasized that the issues between Erbil and Baghdad should be resolved in accordance with the constitution. The Movement's views on the Kurdistan Regional Government's budget have been clearer than those of all other Shiite forces.
They Supported the consolidation of the Kurdistan Regional Government's share of the budget in the Iraqi budget laws.
What distinguishes The Movement's view from that of the Sadr movement towards the Kurdistan Region is that it has a more friendly relationship with the political forces in the Kurdistan Region and supports the rights of the Kurdish people more openly than the Sadrists.
Another prominent Shiite movement is currently the Nasr coalition of Haider al-Abadi:
In 1980, he held important positions in the Da'wa Party. But when he took over as prime minister in 2014, only 22 members of Badr's parliament supported him. Later, for the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections, he formed a list called the Nasr Coalition and won 42 seats.
In many ways, Abadi's view of the Kurdistan Region is not very different from that of the Dawa Party. But because Abbadi is working largely differently from the political line of the Da'wa Party, which is affiliated with the Resistance Front, there is hope that he will change his views in favor of the Kurdistan Region in the future.